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Strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian and disaster relief assistance of the United Nations, including special economic assistance: special economic assistance to individual countries or regions

Humanitarian assistance and rehabilitation for selected countries and regions

Report of the Secretary-General

Summary

The present report is submitted to the General Assembly in compliance with its requests contained in resolutions 64/74 and 64/250. It provides a status report and an analysis of the current challenges encountered in the delivery of both humanitarian relief and rehabilitation assistance provided by the United Nations and its partners to countries affected by various types of natural and man-made disasters. In compliance with the request of the Assembly to consolidate and streamline reports whenever possible, the country reports under the present agenda item have once again been consolidated into a single document, covering two countries, Haiti and El Salvador.

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I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted to the General Assembly in compliance with its requests contained in resolutions 64/74 and 64/250. The report covers the period from November 2009 to July 2010.

II. Humanitarian, emergency relief and rehabilitation assistance provided to Haiti in response to the devastating effects of the earthquake in that country

2. The information provided in sections A and B of the present report is based largely on the six-month report of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee on the response to the humanitarian crisis in Haiti, introduced during the humanitarian affairs segment of the 2010 substantive session of the Economic and Social Council, held in New York.

A. The disaster

3. The earthquake that occurred in Haiti struck at 16.53 local time on 12 January 2010 and had a magnitude of 7.0 on the Richter scale. Its hypocentre was located less than 10 km below the Earth's surface. The epicentre was close to Léogâne, approximately 25 km from Port-au-Prince. An aftershock with a magnitude of 6.0 occurred immediately afterwards, and by 24 January at least 52 aftershocks measuring 4.5 or higher had been recorded.

4. While the exact number of deaths and injuries caused by the earthquake may never be known, the Government estimates that 222,750 people (2 per cent of the population) were killed and 300,572 injured. It is estimated that 3 million people, out of a total population of 10 million, were affected. The human cost of the earthquake in terms of deaths, injuries and homelessness per capita was far greater than that of other recent earthquakes of similar amplitude, primarily because it occurred in a large urban area with many poorly constructed buildings. It is likely that females represented the greatest share of casualties, as many women were at home when the earthquake struck, whereas men were at work and children were on their way home from school. In addition, the high level of damage to public buildings resulted in major loss of life among Haiti's civil servants.

Damage to infrastructure

5. The earthquake crippled Haiti's capital and economic heart, Port-au-Prince, and also destroyed or severely damaged buildings and infrastructure elsewhere, particularly in the towns of Léogâne, Petit-Goâve, Jacmel, Pétionville, Delmas and Carrefour. The Government estimates that 250,000 homes and 30,000 commercial buildings were severely damaged, while the post-disaster needs assessment identified 105,000 completely destroyed homes and more than 208,000 damaged homes. In addition, numerous prominent Government buildings, the cathedral of Port-au-Prince and other public buildings were damaged to varying degrees. In outlying towns affected by the earthquake, municipal administration buildings were

severely damaged. In Léogâne, the closest town to the epicentre, close to 80 per cent of all buildings suffered structural damage.

6. The earthquake seriously damaged the control tower at Toussaint Louverture International Airport and the Port-au-Prince seaport, limiting the use of both the airport and the harbour in the initial stages of the response. Many roads were blocked with debris or had broken surfaces. There was also considerable damage to the communications infrastructure. The earthquake damaged Haiti's only submarine telecommunications cable and rendered unusable the public telephone system, while the services of two of the largest cellular telephone providers were disrupted.

Displacement

7. According to Government figures, approximately 2.3 million people left their homes at the peak of the displacement. Most internally displaced persons settled close to their former areas of residence, either as individual households or in small household groupings. Many settled in the street, at spontaneous settlement sites varying in population from a handful to 50,000, or in collective accommodations. Initially, some 1.5 million displaced people settled in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, while approximately 600,000 left the affected area, many assisted by the Government and others using private means, to seek shelter with host communities in non-affected areas. Up to 250,000 persons in the latter group have since returned to Port-au-Prince or surrounding communes, either as households or individually. As at the end of May 2010, 1,342 sites for internally displaced persons had been identified in the area affected by the earthquake, the majority of which had populations of between 100 and 1,000 households. In some cases, the sites are located in gullies or flood-prone zones, adding to the vulnerability of those displaced.

Impact on the economy, livelihoods and education

8. In total, the damage and losses caused by the earthquake are estimated to amount to $7.8 billion, which is equivalent to slightly more than the country's gross domestic product (GDP) for 2009. The private sector suffered 70 per cent of the damage and losses. Education facilities were severely affected, with 4,992 schools (23 per cent of the country's schools) either damaged or destroyed. More than 1 million students and 55,000 teachers were affected, while 38,000 students and 1,500 education personnel died.

9. The Haitian health-care system suffered catastrophic damage to its infrastructure. In the three most affected geographic departments (Ouest, Sud-Est and Nippes), 60 per cent of hospitals were severely damaged or destroyed, including the only national teaching and reference (tertiary) hospital. The building housing the Ministry of Health itself collapsed, killing more than 200 staff. The initial damage assessment identified 67 affected health facilities in the services network whose operations had been impaired. The already limited drinking water coverage and waste collection capacity in the affected area were further reduced. There were also severe consequences for the agricultural sector. Thirty-two per cent of farmers in the earthquake-affected rural areas lost their seed stocks, with 4 per cent losing their livestock. Twenty-nine per cent of farm homes were either destroyed or severely damaged. Furthermore, farmers were affected by falling agricultural incomes, the loss of storage and irrigation facilities and distorted markets.

10. Populations outside the earthquake-affected area were also affected from a socio-economic and livelihoods perspective. Vulnerability in those areas increased as a result of the massive displacement of people from the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, exerting additional pressure on available resources (such as food and firewood), particularly in departments such as Artibonite and Nord-Ouest, which had already been experiencing chronic food insecurity. More than 90 per cent of the internally displaced persons in those areas are being supported by host families, with more than 80 per cent hosted by members of their immediate families. As a consequence, many host families have reportedly resorted to unsustainable coping mechanisms, such as the selling of animals and assets and the consumption of household food reserves, in order to be able to support themselves and the internally displaced households that they are hosting.

11. There has been a particularly high impact in areas near the country's border with the Dominican Republic, to which an estimated 160,000 people have been displaced. Host communities there, particularly in rural areas, are very poor, and, with the arrival of large numbers of internally displaced persons, the basic services in those areas — schools, health-care centres and water supplies — as well as the local economy, are severely overstretched. Humanitarian organizations visiting areas close to the border, such as Fonds-Verrettes in the south-east, or Ouanaminthe in the north-east, reported that households that had previously been composed of 4 to 5 persons were now housing between 12 and 15.

B. Humanitarian response

12. In the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, the response was led by the Haitian population. Local communities conducted countless rescue efforts and provided support to the injured. Neighbours, friends, family members and strangers helped one another, saving thousands of lives, while the Government and the international community mobilized their response and tried to overcome initial constraints. However, local communities faced major constraints in their immediate response capacity, including an absence of electricity, widespread debris, limited first-aid skills and extensive trauma, which were compounded by a pervasive fear of aftershocks. Haitian civil society organizations were very active in providing immediate assistance to the affected and displaced population, despite the fact that they themselves had also been extensively affected.

13. The destruction of many national and municipal authority buildings, the death and injury of many civil servants, and the fact that they needed to prioritize support for their own extended families significantly reduced the Government's capacity at both the national and the local levels to lead and coordinate an effective response at the initial stages. The critical national disaster risk management system sustained heavy losses in terms of human and material resources.

14. International humanitarian organizations established in Haiti prior to the disaster began to provide assistance within the first 72 hours. Nearly all were supported by national counterparts within Haitian civil society. Organizations used their pre-positioned relief supplies in the country (mostly contingency stocks left over from preparedness activities for the 2009 hurricane season) to support initial assistance. However, many humanitarian actors present in Haiti prior to the earthquake themselves suffered losses — both in terms of staff killed and injured,

and in terms of offices and homes damaged and destroyed — significantly reducing their response capacities.

15. An initial $575 million six-month flash appeal was prepared within 72 hours and launched on 15 January. This amount was to cover the immediate needs of 3 million affected people, according to preliminary estimates. The appeal was revised upward to $1.5 billion on 18 February, following a more comprehensive needs assessment. During the Mid-Year Review of the Humanitarian Appeal 2010, launched on 14 July, requirements still stood at $1.5 billion. As at 18 August, the appeal was 67 per cent funded, with another $18 million having been pledged. However, it is imperative that full funding of the appeal be achieved if the most vulnerable are to receive the assistance they need.

16. The Central Emergency Response Fund has allocated a total of $36 million for the Haiti response, as well as $2 million for operations in the Dominican Republic. The Emergency Relief Response Fund for Haiti, supported by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, has received some $80 million, of which $64 million has already been programmed.

17. The international actors responding to the earthquake were a remarkably varied group. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs estimated that 400 humanitarian actors were operational by the end of January alone. With such a large number, effective coordination was critical to the response. The cluster system was activated on 15 January, organizing the response operation through 12 clusters and 2 sub-clusters. To the extent possible, the Government appointed counterpart Ministries to co-lead each cluster, and by May it had intensified its involvement with clusters in response planning and implementation at all levels.

18. The humanitarian country team was established during the first week of February and met twice per week throughout the initial emergency phase to address key strategic issues related to the humanitarian response. The team is led by the Humanitarian Coordinator and includes the participation of seven United Nations agencies, seven non-governmental organizations, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, observers from the Non-Governmental Organization Coordination Support Office and, in the case of expanded team meetings, humanitarian donors. Strategic coordination was strengthened with the establishment of the positions of a Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator and a Senior Humanitarian Adviser to the Humanitarian Coordinator. The local office of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs was substantially strengthened to provide dedicated support to the humanitarian community in the areas of inter-cluster coordination, information management and analysis, mapping, civil-military liaison, donor coordination, advocacy and media outreach.

19. Effective coordination with the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and with the military forces of the United States of America and other foreign countries, was critical for the humanitarian community in the early stages of the response, to fully capitalize on the substantial military and Mission assets present in the country. A coordination support committee was established to oversee strategic coordination. This unique structure, co-chaired by the Mission's two Deputy Special Representatives of the Secretary-General and the Government, brought together donors, representatives of the humanitarian community, MINUSTAH and representatives of the United States military to address key strategic issues. Through its planning task force, comprising a management

oversight board and a project management coordination cell, the Committee planned complex operations involving multiple stakeholders, addressing critical mitigation measures, debris management and site preparation for the relocation of the internally displaced.

20. MINUSTAH, in coordination with the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the logistics cluster and other key partners, established a joint operations and tasking centre to facilitate the provision of assistance by the broad range of military forces, in order to expedite the activities of the humanitarian community — in essence, to serve as a "one-stop shop" for humanitarian actors seeking the assistance of the Mission's military and police capacities. The centres, composed of representatives of the Office, MINUSTAH, other international military forces, the logistics cluster and the Government, served as a centralized body for coordinating the use of military assets for logistics support, security assistance, and technical assistance in support of humanitarian operations, preventing duplication of support efforts in country-wide coordination. Requests for military assistance combined with the transport of humanitarian commodities or other such support were vetted through each cluster lead agency.

21. In order to ensure that the humanitarian response addressed the needs in the affected areas outside Port-au-Prince, including in host communities, coordination capacity was established in Léogâne, Petit-Goâve, Jacmel and Gonaïves. Eight clusters were operational in Léogâne and seven in Jacmel, with cluster coordination also taking place in Gonaïves and Petit-Goâve. At the subnational level, there was particular emphasis on reinforcing coordination with ministries and local authorities. The humanitarian community also established six "shadow clusters" in the Dominican Republic — logistics and telecommunications; health; emergency shelter; water, sanitation and hygiene; nutrition; and protection — primarily to coordinate support services for the Haiti response operations and border or cross-border relief operations. Coordination was strengthened with non-governmental organization partners, particularly during the first months of the response, through the establishment of a Non-Governmental Organization Coordination Support Office, supported by two non-governmental organization consortiums, InterAction and the International Council of Voluntary Agencies, to facilitate better communication among non-governmental organizations, to create linkages and partnerships with local Haitian organizations unfamiliar with the international humanitarian system, and to ensure that key issues of concern to non-governmental organizations were communicated and taken into account in the response.

Critical humanitarian challenges

22. The humanitarian community's response to the earthquake was a considerable achievement in the face of a multitude of challenges. It represented a major test of the capacity, resources, response readiness and modus operandi of the global humanitarian community. The devastation caused by the earthquake was compounded by underlying vulnerabilities in Haiti, including systemic poverty, structural challenges, weak governance and almost annual exposure to floods, hurricanes and related disasters. In addition, the earthquake occurred in an urban setting, a context that was unfamiliar to many humanitarian actors and presented significant logistics and access hurdles. It is worth recalling that those who would normally have been at the front line of the response in Haiti — the Government, civil society, MINUSTAH and humanitarian organizations with a presence in the

country prior to the earthquake — were themselves severely affected in terms of loss of capacities, resources and staff, which seriously undermined their ability to respond effectively and swiftly. Despite the challenging operating environment, the humanitarian operation largely achieved its immediate objectives and responded effectively to the critical needs identified.

23. Within the first six months of the humanitarian response, approximately 4 million people had received food assistance, emergency shelter materials had been distributed to 1.5 million people, safe water had been made available to 1.2 million, and 1 million had benefited from cash-for-work programmes. In camps and spontaneous settlements, basic services such as health clinics, educational support, and water and sanitation facilities had been provided to approximately 1.5 million internally displaced persons, while joint patrolling by MINUSTAH and Haitian police were helping to protect the most vulnerable. In rural areas, more than 142,000 farming families had been supported with critical inputs for the spring planting season, while targeted nutritional programmes had been implemented to reduce severe acute malnutrition among those affected by the earthquake. Essential to the efficiency of the response have been common logistics services supporting more than 90 humanitarian organizations in the delivery of a total of 9,300 metric tons of life-saving relief supplies from the Dominican Republic.

24. In an operation of the size and complexity of the earthquake response in Haiti, coherent and commonly agreed humanitarian coordination mechanisms are critical from the outset, to help to channel and coordinate the wide-ranging resources and capacities available. The influx of thousands of humanitarian actors with varying degrees of capacity and expertise posed a challenge for the coordination dynamics of the response. The presence and assets of well-resourced and potent military entities, including in particular the United States military, but also MINUSTAH, presented both opportunities and challenges for the humanitarian community. Humanitarian actors required military support in facilitating the transport and distribution of assistance, but were reluctant to engage too closely, as that would risk undermining the humanitarian principles so central to their modus operandi. The swift establishment of clusters to ensure effective sectoral coordination, and the convening of the humanitarian country team to provide overall strategic guidance, were positive steps towards strengthened coordination of the response. Meanwhile, the establishment of coordination structures engaging both military and humanitarian actors in a joint decision-making and resource-tasking enterprise was critical to the absorption of extensive military assets into the humanitarian response operation.

25. Despite those significant achievements, there was a perception of a leadership/coordination deficit in Haiti during the initial phase of the response operation, in which others — for example, military actors — believed that they had to step in to supplement humanitarian leadership on the ground, which they saw as not providing sufficient strategic vision or overall visible coherence. They considered that critical strategic decisions having an impact on the efficacy and appropriateness of the humanitarian response — such as those involving strategies to provide for immediate assistance to and the longer-term resettlement of those displaced, and more strategic targeting of assistance to prevent significant population movements — were slow in coming. Regardless of the validity of that criticism in the initial weeks following the earthquake, huge strides were made during subsequent months in strengthening the coordination of the response.

Humanitarian leadership was strengthened over time, and clusters became increasingly operational, deploying senior and experienced coordinators and providing effective coordination in a potentially chaotic operating environment. The initial coordination and leadership challenges do not bring into question individual performance, but rather highlight the need to reinforce endorsed systems and structures and to make sure that individuals required to lead are provided with the means to do so.

26. In a highly complex context such as Haiti, the humanitarian community was faced with challenging dilemmas in the provision of assistance, not least in identifying the most vulnerable and in distinguishing between those affected by the earthquake and those suffering from chronic poverty — in this instance, the majority of the population. An equally challenging question was related to identifying and strengthening the linkages between the relief operation and longer-term reconstruction and development efforts. The humanitarian community in Haiti had a critical role to play in supporting the Government, which itself had been severely affected by the earthquake, in leading the reconstruction efforts. Particularly during the initial phase of the response, the international humanitarian community's engagement with Haitian civil society and local authorities, and their inclusion in common coordination mechanisms, could have been better. Had this been accomplished in a more systematic manner, it would have significantly improved the humanitarian community's understanding of the operating context and contributed to the more sustainable provision of assistance, as well as to local and national capacity-building.

27. With a cross-sectoral funding appeal revised in June to request nearly $1.5 billion for relief operations alone, it is clear that the needs in Haiti are still immense and the challenges facing the response operation potentially daunting. Foremost among those challenges is providing shelter, including in particular identifying with the Government durable solutions aimed at the secure settlement of the displaced population. Providing safer shelter alternatives will require significant financial resources, complex legal arrangements and the mobilization of all actors around a shared vision. The issue of inadequate shelter is particularly worrisome during the hurricane season, which is why contingency planning and preparedness activities have been a major focus in recent months.

Gender aspects

28. Women and men as well as girls and boys are affected differently in times of crisis and experience different challenges in gaining access to humanitarian protection and assistance. In Haiti, a Gender Adviser from the Gender Standby Capacity roster was deployed immediately following the earthquake to provide advice to clusters/sectors on gender mainstreaming. This included guidance on safe food distribution, safe shelters, separate latrines and bathing facilities, ensuring equal access to income-generating efforts and including women in camp management. Moving forward, priority should be given to the creation of economic opportunities for marginalized groups in society, in particular women, who make up more than 60 per cent of heads of households in Haiti.

29. Poverty is the underlying cause of gender inequity and among the main causes of sexual violence. This is compounded by women's lack of decision-making power in Haitian society and by poorly functioning Government institutions, including

poor service delivery. Sexual violence was exacerbated by the disaster, and measures to prevent gender-based violence, including protection patrols and improved lighting in camps, were immediately put into place. Providing assistance to victims of gender-based violence, including ensuring safe access to medical care and other referral options, was also prioritized. The opportunity presented by the upcoming elections in November 2010 to advocate at the political, social and economic levels the reformation of Government institutions in order to enforce the rule of law and end the impunity of perpetrators of violence will be seized.

30. Protecting vulnerable populations from sexual exploitation and abuse remains a priority for development, humanitarian and peacekeeping personnel. In Haiti, work to prevent sexual exploitation and abuse was undertaken early in the post-earthquake response with the deployment of a full-time coordinator who worked with United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations to put into place awareness-raising and complaint mechanisms in order to prevent and respond to abuses.

Findings and lessons learned

31. The challenging and complex nature of the humanitarian response to the Haiti earthquake has presented the humanitarian community with some key lessons. Foremost among them is that there is a need to understand better — and to work more proactively with — various actors from outside the humanitarian context, including military entities and the private sector. Linked to this is the pressing imperative of identifying ways in which to engage better with affected Governments and civil society partners. The global humanitarian architecture must be improved to ensure that it is not implemented in such a way as to preclude such partnerships, which are critical for the most effective responses.

32. Another key lesson learned is that the humanitarian community must review how it should adapt to urban responses and must identify the expertise, tools, knowledge and partnerships it needs if it is to be able to operate effectively in such environments. More broadly, there is a need to ensure a better understanding of vulnerability and what it means in terms of humanitarian assistance strategies. One way to do this is by learning how to communicate better with disaster-affected populations, which would lead to an improved understanding of the operating context.

33. It is clear that strong, decisive and empowered humanitarian leadership on the ground at all levels is essential for the effective functioning of a response operation. With strong and experienced leadership providing the required strategic vision, including within the clusters, operational response becomes more efficient, effective, and coherent.

34. Thus, the role of the Humanitarian Coordinator is critical in the overall leadership of the response. The Coordinator is responsible for providing strategic vision and guidance to the humanitarian community, for establishing and maintaining comprehensive coordination mechanisms that include all operational actors, for helping to determine the division of responsibilities among agencies, for maintaining close liaison with the Government, and for ensuring coordination with all other actors relevant to the response. In a context such as Haiti, it was clear that those functions could not have been effectively performed by one person alone,

particularly if that person also had responsibilities within an integrated United Nations mission.

35. The swift establishment of a coherent and well-functioning humanitarian country team, particularly in a large-scale sudden-onset emergency, is critical for the efficacy of the response, primarily as it provides the necessary strategic guidance to the operational actors engaged in the response through the cluster system.

36. If clusters are to become rapidly operational so that they can coordinate a plethora of humanitarian partners within coherent and efficient sectoral structures, it is imperative that they be able to deploy experienced and well-resourced cluster coordinators in the initial stages of the response. Cluster lead agencies must be as accountable for the way in which they carry out their responsibilities within the cluster as they are for the way in which they do so within their respective agencies. It is critical that they balance those sometimes competing roles and ensure that appropriate and adequate resources are allocated for the effective functioning of the clusters that they lead. It is also crucial that cluster lead agencies represent not only agency priorities, but also cluster priorities, at strategic discussions within the framework of the humanitarian country team. It is equally important that the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, as the entity responsible for inter-cluster coordination, demonstrate appropriate coordination and leadership capacity from the earliest phase of the operation, so as to support the clusters in doing their jobs more effectively.

C. Early recovery and reconstruction

37. From the outset of the humanitarian response, as well as during the recovery and reconstruction phases, the United Nations country team has integrated and implemented early recovery activities in consultation with the Government.

38. Given the challenges that Haiti was facing before the disaster, recovery efforts have been aimed at addressing wider needs and at "building back better". Prior to the earthquake, 55 per cent of the population lived on less than $1.25 per day, only 51 per cent of the rural population and 70 per cent of the urban population had access to clean drinking water, and less than 32 per cent of the total population had access to adequate sanitation (as little as 18 per cent in rural areas). At 72 deaths per 1,000 live births, the child mortality rate was extremely high, twice the regional average, and children were afflicted by high rates of stunting (22 per cent of those under 5) and wasting (10 per cent of those under 5). Between 28 and 38 per cent of the population was considered acutely food-insecure. Forty-four per cent of people urgently requiring health care were unable to gain access to health services, owing to a lack of means to pay for medical fees. Between 50 and 55 per cent of children were not enrolled in school, resulting in one of the highest illiteracy rates on the continent.

39. Furthermore, for several decades, unbridled urbanization has been an emerging hazard in the city of Port-au-Prince and in the surrounding metropolitan area, as well as in most towns in the countryside. The lack of skills and expertise in building reinforced concrete structures, and the failure to maintain buildings and to strengthen building codes are the most serious problems facing urban settlements in Haiti. The insufficient quality control over self-built and contractor-built structures, the lack of regulation of and control over land use and urban planning, and the lack

of knowledge about risk zoning have further increased the vulnerability of urban dwellers. Rapid and unplanned urbanization have also created challenges for the effective provision of public services such as water, energy, sanitation and household waste collection. There are no road systems near most slums, and those that do exist are unpaved and are damaged during the rainy season each year.

40. Given those underlying challenges, the Organization's vision is one of helping the Government to build a more decentralized and deconcentrated Haiti in which homes, infrastructures and services can withstand natural disasters and people's lives are protected. Following are some of the main rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts conducted to date.

Post-disaster needs assessment

41. The post-disaster needs assessment, led by the Government and supported by the United Nations and the World Bank, determined the extent of the damages, losses and recovery and reconstruction needs resulting directly or indirectly from the earthquake. The assessment also identified medium- to longer-term recovery and reconstruction needs across a range of sectors, including broadly defined economic recovery needs of directly and indirectly affected populations, as well as the need to integrate disaster risk reduction into the most vulnerable sectors, such as education, health, habitat and the environment.

Cash for work

42. A cash-for-work programme was introduced eight days after the earthquake to provide short-term employment opportunities and to inject money into the local economy in areas affected by the earthquake. The programme has also been aimed at increasing social and economic stability and improving food security during a period of high vulnerability. It has been implemented in collaboration with key Government partners, the Direction Nationale de l'Eau Potable et de l'Assainissement, the Ministries of the Environment and Agriculture, local authorities and national and international non-governmental organizations.

43. As at 1 July 2010, more than 116,000 workers had been employed, 40 per cent of whom are women. Working six-hour shifts on a 12- or 24-day cycle, workers have undertaken labour-intensive tasks such as removing and disposing of street debris and garbage, and cleaning drainage systems and canals used as water evacuation routes in preparation for the rainy season. In collaboration with the World Food Programme (WFP), 19 joint cash/food-for-work projects (compensation includes 60 per cent cash and 40 per cent food) have been implemented in localities affected directly or indirectly by the earthquake, employing some 13,000 people per month. The projects have been focused on small-scale infrastructure rehabilitation and disaster risk mitigation, such as the rehabilitation or construction of schools, health-care facilities, water and sanitation systems, marketplaces, irrigation systems, watershed management systems and recreation facilities. Support for the recovery of the private sector and for the development of private-public sector partnerships is also planned.

Disaster risk reduction and preparedness

44. The United Nations is continuing its efforts to support the Government by strengthening its disaster risk management programme. Efforts have been focused

on strengthening the national risk and disaster management system and the Direction de la Protection Civile. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Disaster Risk Reduction, Margareta Wahlström, visited Haiti in April to meet with Government officials and review opportunities to strengthen risk reduction measures in the context of both the ongoing humanitarian efforts and the initial recovery work. She recommended that efforts be focused on preparedness for the hurricane season, mainly through the strengthening of existing local capacities and warning systems, and that an independent mechanism be established to monitor the integration of risk into the recovery efforts in support of the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission.

45. The United Nations, the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, with support from the Office of the Special Envoy for Haiti, initiated a rapid multi-hazard analysis and maps to support the humanitarian activities and longer-term recovery efforts. The analysis also resulted in recommendations for the strengthening of national institutions in the area of disaster risk assessment. The information produced was integrated into existing national centres for data management and the Geographic Information System.

46. In preparation for the hurricane season, the United Nations established four logistics hubs within the country, with WFP pre-positioning 2 million emergency rations and the shelter cluster stockpiling emergency shelter supplies and other non-food items. Furthermore, the United Nations carried out risk assessment and mitigation efforts in more than 130 vulnerable camps and explained basic preparedness techniques to camp residents. The United Nations has also set aside $13 million as emergency funding in the event of a humanitarian crisis.

Land use planning and natural resource management

47. As part of the Government's programme on territorial information for sustainable development, and as recommended by the post-disaster needs assessment as an urgent priority, the United Nations supported the establishment of a national observatory on the environment and vulnerability to gather data and provide analysis to promote more effective interventions. The Organization also played a key role in mobilizing financial resources for environmental programmes aimed at improving the management of key watersheds and protected areas as a strategy for increasing the country's resilience.

Debris management

48. The United Nations debris management programme contributed technical expertise to the debris removal and recycling strategies of the Government and the humanitarian community. In an effort to promote sustainable recycling, rather than just demolition and dumping, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), in partnership with the Office of the Mayor of Léogâne and the humanitarian community, launched a pilot recycling site for debris and showcased best practices that could serve as a neighbourhood-based recovery model for other programmes throughout the country.

Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals programme

49. During the post-disaster needs assessment exercise, in the light of the "brain drain" that had been occurring since the earthquake, the Government of Haiti

identified the need to engage the Haitian diaspora to assist in the country's recovery. On the basis of previous knowledge and experience gained through the Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals programme of United Nations Volunteers, UNDP has proposed a three-year programme to enable expatriates to return home for a period ranging from two weeks to three months to lend their skills and services to the development of their homeland. A first consultation workshop, chaired by the Ministry of Haitians Living Abroad and held on 11 June in Port-au-Prince, brought together representatives of the diaspora, local authorities, the private sector, civil society and the international community to explore the best means by which the programme could assist in rebuilding Haiti.

Rule of law, justice and security

50. As an immediate response to the destruction of the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, the United Nations identified immediate needs and provided basic equipment to the justice, prison and police sectors. Four prefabricated buildings serving as temporary offices for senior ministry officials were erected, and two 250-square-metre tents with 55 workstations were provided for the Ministry and the Haitian National Police. The Ministry was also supported in modernizing the prison at Saint Marc and through the provision of Internet facilities. In addition, UNDP is supporting the ministerial Cabinet through the provision of full office facilities.

51. The United Nations supported the police and the judiciary by providing for training and capacity-building. Training was provided for 15 public prosecutors at the Ecole de la Magistrature d'Haiti, for magistrates in France in autumn 2010 and for the Ministry's unit heads, and a course in crime scene management was provided for police and magistrates. In order to respond to the particular needs of displaced people, the United Nations is supporting, on a pilot basis, a mobile court to deal with day-to-day criminal cases. The United Nations is also involved in the construction of the maritime base and the building housing the office of the Inspector General of the National Police in Les Cayes. It has also supported the Government in strengthening the national detainee database, which serves as the main tool enabling the National Police and United Nations police to identify prisoners who escaped following the earthquake.

"Football for peace"

52. On 19 June, the UNDP rule-of-law programme kicked off its "football for peace" initiative. Conducted in some of the larger towns outside Port-au-Prince, events included a football tournament featuring teams comprising police officers, students, journalists and teenagers, as well as screenings of recorded football games, anti-violence movies and documentaries, followed by group discussions. The "football for peace" initiative is part of a UNDP partnership with the United Nations Development Fund for Women, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the United Nations Population Fund aimed at raising awareness in communities throughout Haiti about efforts to prevent domestic violence, crime and gender-based violence.

Aid management and coordination

53. In the spirit of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action, a customized aid information management system was developed and operationalized by the United Nations in 2008 for the Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation, with the aim of bolstering national capacities for the planning and monitoring of external aid. As a result of the upsurge in international aid pledges following the earthquake, UNDP scaled up its aid management engagement, brought new partners on board and developed a new project to support the Ministry, the Office of the Prime Minister, other Government bodies and relevant partners, including the private sector, in addressing challenges related to the effective and transparent management of external aid.

Findings and lessons learned

54. In order to be successful, the humanitarian response in Haiti must dovetail with the recovery and reconstruction efforts, having clear priorities and benchmarks. The establishment of the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission is an important step in that regard.

55. It is important to provide people with the right incentives to move out of the camps and to return to their communities and neighbourhoods. While life-supporting services such as a water supply will be required by those who have no choice but to stay in camps, it is vital to avoid attracting people to the camps by concentrating services there that could be provided elsewhere. Facilities such as schools and clinics should be based in communities, not in camps, so that those who return home can have continued access to help.

56. Rubble removal is a major challenge. The earthquake generated more than 20 million cubic metres of debris, which is a major impediment to reconstruction. The necessary scaling-up of the removal process, however, requires not only more trucks, but also more appropriate landfill sites designated by the Government. In addition to the purely physical removal of rubble, there is the opportunity to stimulate communities through an improved quality of life.

57. Participation is also vital. The Organization must become better at talking and listening to communities, and at involving them as partners in the response. It is only with the full participation and involvement of local communities that effective reconstruction will be achieved. The people of Haiti must be the architects of their own recovery and future.

58. The deconcentration of the urban population and development efforts beyond the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area are essential. Already today, the United Nations has more than 500 civilian personnel located outside the capital, working on humanitarian and recovery initiatives.

59. The need for disaster risk reduction must be addressed early in the humanitarian and recovery processes. If this is to be done effectively, there must be baseline information regarding the level and the distribution of risk, as well as standards and codes and the capacity to enforce them. Incentives and capacities for addressing risk across recovery efforts in all sectors will be an essential first step, together with ongoing monitoring.

III. Humanitarian, emergency relief and rehabilitation assistance provided to El Salvador as a result of the devastating effects of Hurricane Ida

A. The disaster

60. On 7 November 2009, the combined effects of Hurricane Ida and a low-pressure system off the Pacific coast produced heavy rainfall in El Salvador (355mm within a few hours), causing severe flooding and landslides in 7 of the country's 14 geographical departments (25 per cent of the national territory) and resulting in 199 casualties. In total, more than 120,000 people were affected, with some 15,000 fleeing to emergency shelters during the initial weeks following the disaster.

61. A post-disaster needs assessment indicated that damage and losses amounted to approximately $240 million, representing 1.1 per cent of the country's gross national product. This included $89.4 million in losses associated with infrastructure damage, as well as a slowdown in productive and social activities. El Salvador also suffered $42.5 million in agricultural losses, with heavy damage to irrigation systems and losses in terms of crops such as coffee, sugar cane and red beans. The housing sector registered losses and damage totalling some $18.4 million, with 20,000 homes destroyed, severely damaged or at risk. The Government estimated that $343 million was needed to ensure the recovery of affected areas.

B. Response

62. Overall, the United Nations system invested $16 million to provide assistance to more than 120,000 people in the aftermath of Hurricane Ida and to support the Government of El Salvador in coordinating the humanitarian response in key areas: food assistance, education, temporary shelter, agriculture, health care, water and sanitation, coordination and early recovery.

63. In response to the disaster, the United Nations immediately activated its contingency plan and provided support to the Government by assessing the damage. A humanitarian country team was deployed, including representatives of IOM and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. A disaster assessment and coordination team was immediately deployed to support the Government and the United Nations system with needs assessment expertise, information analysis and initial coordination of relief efforts. Recommendations made by the team served to strengthen the national disaster response and preparedness capacity beyond the immediate relief phase. In terms of the cluster system, the humanitarian country team activated clusters in the areas mentioned above. At the global level, both the shelter cluster and the water, sanitation and hygiene cluster were activated, which proved crucial in meeting gaps related to those two sectors in the initial response.

64. On 18 November 2009, the humanitarian community in El Salvador, with support from staff of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs deployed from its regional office in Panama, and in close cooperation with the Government, launched a flash appeal requesting $14 million to initially assist 75,000 people over a six-month period. The humanitarian country team also requested and received $2.5 million in rapid response grants from the Central

Emergency Response Fund. Unfortunately, overall donor funding of the appeal stalled at 46 per cent ($6.7 million). As is often the case in similar emergencies in Latin America, the Fund was the single largest funding source, representing 37 per cent of all resources mobilized by the flash appeal and approximately 14 per cent of the overall international humanitarian funding received by El Salvador. The Government also allocated a significant amount of funding for immediate relief operations.

Food assistance

65. WFP provided food assistance to 11,000 people in shelters as well as to 155 communities in 35 municipalities located in seven departments of the country. More than 55,000 people benefited from food-for-work programmes focusing on rehabilitation and reconstruction. More than 7,000 children under 5 years old, pregnant and lactating mothers and elderly persons in affected communities received supplementary nutrition.

Agriculture

66. In order to support and reactivate agricultural activities in the affected areas, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations assisted 1,000 families by establishing backyard plots in eight municipalities. More than 1,500 small producers received seeds and fertilizer in 13 municipalities, and 674 families in 4 municipalities were provided with modules for breeding dual-purpose birds.

Health care

67. Health-care assistance was provided to 122,000 people to reduce morbidity and mortality among the affected population and to improve access to health-care services. More than 5,015 family kits and 4,165 women's personal hygiene kits were distributed to people housed in shelters.

Water, sanitation and hygiene

68. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) provided 50,000 plastic containers and disinfectant for water, and the Pan American Health Organization provided 100 latrines and showers for a population of 28,000 and materials for the cleaning of 50 community wells.

Education and protection

69. UNICEF provided school furniture and educational materials for 22 damaged schools. Additionally, 51 days of training were provided for more than 2,000 young people, and 500 psychosocial kits were distributed.

Shelter

70. IOM provided assistance and monitoring activities in 74 shelters throughout the country, with a total population of 7,518. UNICEF delivered 2,000 kits including essential items to encourage people to return from shelters to their settlements.

Temporary housing

71. UNDP played a key role in leading, in coordination with the Government, donors and non-governmental organizations, efforts to build temporary housing. UNDP supported the construction of 763 temporary houses in 19 municipalities located in 5 departments. As part of the temporary housing programme, community organizing and cash-for-work projects were carried out.

National civil protection system

72. In order to strengthen the national civil protection system, the United Nations supported five technical committees (related to emergency response, infrastructure and basic services, health care, logistics and shelter) in preparing and updating their preparedness and response plans. In support of local institutions, the Organization also supported the establishment of municipal civil protection commissions in the most affected regions — Verapaz, Tepetitán and Guadalupe — to strengthen emergency response and preparedness capacities relating to first aid, the legal aspects of civil protection, emergency management, inter-institutional communication and the management of temporary shelters.

Disaster risk reduction

73. The Inter-Agency Secretariat of the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction has been supporting and advising the national civil protection directorate of El Salvador in developing a national disaster risk reduction plan and strengthening its national disaster risk reduction platform, in close consultation with the Coordination Centre for the Prevention of Natural Disasters in Central America. The United Nations country team devoted considerable effort to the integration of risk management into a national urban and rural poverty programme. In two municipalities, the initiative built the capacities of partner institutions in terms of risk management and prevention, and emergency response. It will be replicated in 25 other municipalities.